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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
Vernel Aubrey Williams appeals his judgment of 
conviction and the sentence imposed by the District Court, 
contending that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174, were violated.  Williams argues that 
the District Court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the 
Indictment, in which he asserted that time had elapsed in 
excess of the seventy-day period during which the Speedy Trial 
Act requires the Government to commence a trial of a 
defendant, and Williams petitions the Court to dismiss the 
Indictment with prejudice.  For the reasons that follow, we hold 
that Williams’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were 
violated, and we will reverse the order of the District Court 
denying Williams’s motions to dismiss the Indictment, vacate 
the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed, and remand 
to the District Court with the direction to dismiss the 
Indictment with prejudice. 
I. 
On January 28, 2014, the Government charged 
Williams, in a five-count Information, with (a) possessing a 
firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) and 924(a)(4); (b) discharging a 
firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(3)(A) and 924(a)(4); (c) discharging a 
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); (d) assault with a deadly 
weapon, in violation of V.I. Code tit. 14, § 295(2); and (e) 
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possessing, transporting, and carrying a firearm during the 
commission of a crime of violence, in violation of V.I. Code 
tit. 14, § 2253(a).  The charges contained in the Information 
arose from Williams’s conduct on December 24, 2013, when 
the Government alleges that Williams shot a store owner on St. 
Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, during an altercation that began 
inside the store owner’s place of business and ended outside of 
a nearby elementary and high school. 
Nearly a month after the Government’s filing the 
Information, but before Williams had been arraigned, 
Williams’s counsel filed a motion for a hearing to determine 
Williams’s mental competency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(a).  Thereafter, the District Court granted Williams’s 
motion, ordering Williams to undergo a psychological 
examination.  Williams refused to participate in the court-
ordered psychological examination, however, and thus the 
District Court neither received a formal report nor held a 
hearing with respect to Williams’s competency.  As a result, 
the Government filed its own motion for a hearing to determine 
Williams’s competency, which the District Court granted on 
June 11, 2014.  The District Court ordered that Williams be 
transported to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North 
Carolina (“FMC Butner”), to undergo a psychological 
examination.  
The following day—June 12, 2014—a grand jury 
returned a five-count Indictment, charging Williams with (a) 
discharging a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(3)(A) and 924(a)(4); (b) 
possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) and 924(a)(4); 
(c) possessing, on a separate occasion, a firearm within 1,000 
feet of a school zone, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) 
and 924(a)(4); (d) assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of 
V.I. Code tit. 14, § 297(2); and (e) possessing, transporting, 
and carrying a firearm during the commission of a crime of 
violence, in violation of V.I. Code tit. 14, § 2253(a).  Four of 
the counts arose from the same conduct that was the subject of 
the charges contained in the Information; the second count for 
possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone arose 
from Williams’s arrest on December 29, 2013.  On June 18, 
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2014, Williams was arraigned with respect to the charges 
contained in the Indictment. 
Pursuant to the District Court’s order dated June 11, 
2014, Williams was transported to FMC Butner to undergo a 
psychological examination, but Williams did not arrive at FMC 
Butner until July 29, 2014.  Following an examination of 
Williams, on October 31, 2014, a forensic psychologist 
submitted a formal report to the District Court with respect to 
Williams’s competency.  On November 5, 2014, the District 
Court held a hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, to 
determine Williams’s mental competency.  The District Court 
determined that Williams lacked the mental competency to 
stand trial and, on November 6, 2014, entered an order 
committing Williams to the custody of the United States 
Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). 
During the period of Williams’s incompetency, the 
Government filed a motion to involuntarily medicate Williams, 
in an attempt to restore his competency.  On October 9, 2015, 
the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
Government’s motion.  During a recess, a physician employed 
by FMC Butner—who previously recommended that Williams 
be involuntarily medicated—conducted an examination of 
Williams, after which the physician testified that Williams 
indeed was competent to stand trial.  Following the testimony 
of the physician, the Government withdrew its motion, and the 
District Court indicated that it promptly would set a date for 
Williams’s trial. 
The District Court did not set a trial date, however, and 
neither the Government nor Williams filed any pleadings in the 
case for nearly two months following the evidentiary hearing 
on October 9, 2015.  On December 2, 2015, the Government 
ended the fifty-three-day lapse in activity by filing a motion in 
limine (the “Motion in Limine”) to “exclude evidence, 
argument, or questioning regarding [Williams’s] mental health 
or competency.”  App. 87. 
Rather than filing a brief in opposition to the 
Government’s Motion in Limine, on December 18, 2015, 
Williams filed a motion to dismiss the Indictment (the “First 
Motion to Dismiss”), asserting that his rights under the Speedy 
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Trial Act had been violated.  The Government filed a brief in 
opposition to Williams’s First Motion to Dismiss on December 
31, 2015, and the District Court held an evidentiary hearing 
with respect to Williams’s First Motion to Dismiss on February 
25, 2016.  At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the 
District Court ordered the Government and Williams to submit 
supplemental briefing on certain issues raised during the 
hearing, which the parties submitted on March 10, 2016.  The 
District Court then ordered the Government to reply to the 
arguments raised by Williams in his supplemental brief.  The 
Government, with the District Court’s permission, filed an out-
of-time reply on March 31, 2016. 
Following the Government’s submission on March 31, 
2016, approximately three-and-a-half months elapsed, during 
which neither party filed pleadings and during which the 
District Court took no further action with respect to Williams’s 
First Motion to Dismiss.  Then, on July 15, 2016, Williams 
filed a second motion to dismiss the Indictment (the “Second 
Motion to Dismiss” and, together with the First Motion to 
Dismiss, the “Motions to Dismiss”), reiterating and 
supplementing his arguments that his rights under the Speedy 
Trial Act had been violated.  After nearly three months of 
inaction on the parts of the Government and the District Court 
with respect to his Second Motion to Dismiss, Williams filed a 
writ of mandamus in this Court to compel the District Court to 
rule on the still-pending Motions to Dismiss. 
In response to Williams’s filing his writ of mandamus, 
and prior to this Court’s consideration of Williams’s writ of 
mandamus, the District Court took a number of actions.  On 
October 24, 2016, the District Court set a trial date for the 
matter and ordered Williams to submit a reply brief with 
respect to the Government’s Motion in Limine, which had been 
pending since December 2, 2015.  Two days later, on October 
26, 2016, the District Court, in an order that did not include 
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written reasons,1 denied Williams’s Second Motion to Dismiss 
and denied Williams’s First Motion to Dismiss as moot. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government, 
Williams subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of 
possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(3)(A) and 924(a)(4), but 
explicitly “reserve[d] the right to appeal [any potential] speedy 
trial violation.”  App. 242.  The District Court sentenced 
Williams to a term of “time served” and a one-year period of 
supervised release.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
a district court’s interpretation and application of the 
provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, including those related to 
excludable time.  United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271, 273 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
 III. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.  Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act to give 
effect to this constitutional guarantee “by setting specified time 
limits . . . within which criminal trials must be commenced.”  
United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, “the trial of a 
defendant charged in an information or indictment with the 
commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days 
from the filing date (and making public) of the information or 
indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before 
a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, 
whichever date last occurs.”  18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).  Thus, 
under the Speedy Trial Act, a seventy-day “clock” begins to 
                                                 
1 The District Court’s three-page order quoted relevant 
statutory and constitutional provisions but provided no 
analytical support for its ruling other than a brief statement that 
“[t]he premises [had been] considered.” 
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run upon the latest of (x) the filing of an information, (y) the 
filing of an indictment, or (z) a defendant’s appearance, and the 
Government must commence a trial of the defendant prior to 
the expiration of the seventy-day clock.2 
The Speedy Trial Act provides that certain periods of 
time are “excludable” for purposes of calculating the time 
within which the Government must commence a trial of a 
defendant.  See id. § 3161(h).  In other words, certain events or 
occurrences “stop” the seventy-day speedy trial clock.  Most 
relevant to this appeal,3 the Speedy Trial Act provides that the 
following periods of time are excludable: 
                                                 
2 The Speedy Trial Act also imposes a separate, thirty-day 
clock that begins to run upon the arrest of the defendant or the 
service of a summons, during which the Government must file 
an information or indictment charging the defendant with an 
offense.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).  In his brief, Williams 
argued that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act also had been 
violated with respect to the thirty-day clock.  Because we hold 
that Williams’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated 
with respect to the seventy-day clock, it is unnecessary to 
discuss the separate, thirty-day clock. 
3 Williams argues that additional non-excludable time elapsed 
while the Government’s Motion in Limine was pending.  
Because we hold that non-excludable time elapsed in excess of 
the seventy-day period within which the Government must 
have commenced a trial of Williams—namely, during the 
period between October 9, 2015, and December 2, 2015, and 
during all but ten days of the period between the District 
Court’s order directing Williams to be transported to FMC 
Butner and his arrival there—we need not, and do not, reach 
the issues related to the Government’s Motion in Limine, 
including whether the Motion in Limine is a “pretrial motion” 
that stops the seventy-day clock pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(h)(1)(D) or whether the Motion in Limine was “under 
advisement” by the District Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(1)(H). 
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 “delay resulting from any 
proceeding, including any 
examinations, to determine the 
mental competency . . . of the 
defendant,” id. § 3161(h)(1)(A); 
and 
 “delay resulting from 
transportation of any defendant . . . 
to and from places of examination 
. . . , except that any time 
consumed in excess of ten days 
from the date an order . . . directing 
such transportation, and the 
defendant’s arrival at the 
destination shall be presumed to be 
unreasonable,” id. 
§ 3161(h)(1)(F). 
The Government concedes that fifty-three days—the period 
between the evidentiary hearing on October 9, 2015, and the 
Government’s filing its Motion in Limine on December 2, 
2015—elapsed from the seventy-day speedy trial clock.  The 
controversy in this appeal centers on whether, or to what 
extent, the time between June 11, 2014—when the District 
Court ordered that Williams be transported to FMC Butner to 
undergo a psychological examination—and July 29, 2014—
when Williams arrived at FMC Butner—is excludable for 
purposes of the seventy-day speedy trial clock.4 
This appeal requires us to address, for the first time, the 
interplay between 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A)—which excludes 
periods of delay relating to proceedings to determine a 
defendant’s mental competency—and 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
4 Although this case presents issues with respect to the 
determination of the date on which the seventy-day speedy trial 
clock began to run, it is unnecessary to address these issues 
because all non-excludable time in this case occurred after June 
18, 2014—the date of Williams’s first appearance with respect 
to the charges contained in the Indictment—which is the latest 
date on which the seventy-day clock could have begun to run 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). 
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3161(h)(1)(F)—which excludes certain periods of delay in 
connection with, among other things, transportation of a 
defendant to a psychological examination.  In United States v. 
Graves, 722 F.3d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 2013), we held that “the 
period of excludable delay under § 3161(h)(1)(A) begins when 
a party moves for, or the court sua sponte orders, a competency 
determination” and “continues at least until a competency 
hearing is held.”  In Graves, however, we did not resolve 
whether an unreasonable period of delay in transporting a 
defendant to a psychological examination is non-excludable 
when that period takes place within the confines of a 
“proceeding” to determine the defendant’s mental competency, 
which period would otherwise be excludable pursuant to 
section 3161(h)(1)(A).  See id. at 548 n.6 (“We also need not, 
and do not, resolve the issue of whether an unreasonable delay 
in the transportation of a defendant to a competency 
examination is excludable.  That issue has arisen in other cases 
due to § 3161(h)(1)(F). . . .  [W]e do not reach the question of 
what impact it may have on delays for competency proceedings 
under § 3161(h)(1)(A).” (citation omitted)).  Put differently, 
this appeal requires us to determine whether section 
3161(h)(1)(F) places a limitation on the amount of time that 
can be excluded pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(A) for a 
competency determination. 
Several of our sister circuits have considered this 
question.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has held that any period of delay relating to a 
proceeding to determine a defendant’s mental competency is 
excludable pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(A), regardless of 
whether the delay is unreasonable or related to the transport of 
the defendant to the site of a psychological examination.  See 
United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1990).  
The Second Circuit reasoned that, in its view, the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Henderson v. United States, 476 
U.S. 321, 330 (1986), prohibits courts from considering the 
reasonableness of a delay if the relevant subsection of section 
3161(h) does not contain an explicit “reasonableness” 
qualifier.  Vasquez, 918 F.2d at 333.  Thus, the Second Circuit 
held that all time between the filing of a motion for a 
competency determination and a hearing on such motion is 
excludable because the text of section 3161(h)(1)(A) does not 
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contain any language limiting the applicability of the exclusion 
to only reasonable periods of delay.  See id. 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, 
and Sixth Circuits, however, have taken a contrary position.  
Each of those courts has held that “a delay in transporting a 
defendant to a mental competency examination beyond the 
ten[-]day limit imposed by § 3161(h)(1)(F) is presumptively 
unreasonable, and in the absence of rebutting evidence to 
explain the additional delay, this extra time is not excludable.”  
United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 
2009), aff’d on other grounds, 563 U.S. 647 (2011); accord 
United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Castle, 906 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1990).  The 
First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits reasoned that reading section 
3161(h)(1)(A) to permit the exclusion of an unlimited amount 
of time for the transport of a defendant to the site of a 
psychological examination would render section 3161(h)(1)(F) 
superfluous because the latter subsection specifically states 
that delays of more than ten days in transporting defendants to 
the sites of psychological examinations are presumed to be 
unreasonable.  See Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d at 596 (“The only 
way to avoid conflict between § 3161(h)(1)(A) and § 
3161(h)(1)(F) is to read § 3161(h)(1)(F) as a specific exception 
to the general rule announced in § 3161(h)(1)(A):  i.e., all 
delays caused by proceedings to determine a defendant’s 
competency are excluded, except for the time during which the 
defendant is supposed to be in transit, which is presumptively 
unreasonable if longer than ten days.”). 
We agree with the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, and 
we hold that periods of unreasonable delay of more than ten 
days in the transport of a defendant to the site of a 
psychological examination conducted in the course of a 
proceeding to determine a defendant’s mental competency are 
non-excludable for purposes of computing the time within 
which the Government must commence a trial of a defendant 
under the Speedy Trial Act.  A cardinal rule of statutory 
interpretation is that courts should avoid interpreting a statute 
in ways that would render certain language superfluous.  TRW 
Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal 
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon 
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no 
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clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.”  (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))); see also 
Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 
199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We assume, for example, that every 
word in a statute has meaning and avoid interpreting one part 
of a statute in a manner that renders another 
part superfluous.”).  While we have held that “the period of 
excludable delay under § 3161(h)(1)(A) begins when a party 
moves for, or the court sua sponte orders, a competency 
determination” and “continues at least until a competency 
hearing is held,” Graves, 722 F.3d at 548, interpreting section 
3161(h)(1)(A) to exclude any and all periods of delay in 
transporting a defendant to the site of a psychological 
examination—regardless of whether such delay is in excess of 
ten days and otherwise unreasonable—would read section 
3161(h)(1)(F) out of the statute.  Put simply, both section 
3161(h)(1)(A) and section 3161(h)(1)(F) specifically relate to 
the same “examinations”:  section 3161(h)(1)(A) excludes 
periods of delay with respect to examinations,5 and section 
3161(h)(1)(F) excludes periods of delay in transporting a 
defendant to the site of such examinations and explicitly places 
a potential limitation on the amount of time that may be 
excludable for such transport delays.6  Psychological 
examinations that necessitate the transport of defendants from 
their places of detention typically occur in the context of the 
competency determinations that are the subject of section 
                                                 
5 Section 3161(h)(1)(A) excludes periods of “delay resulting 
from any proceeding, including any examinations, to 
determine the mental competency . . . of the defendant.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added).   
6 Section 3161(h)(1)(F) applies to periods of “delay resulting 
from transportation of any defendant . . . to and from places of 
examination” and automatically excludes a period of up to ten 
days for a defendant’s transport to the site of a psychological 
examination; “any time consumed in excess of ten days from 
the date an order . . . directing such transportation” to the site 
of a psychological examination “and the defendant’s arrival at 
the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable.”  Id. § 
3161(h)(1)(F) (emphasis added). 
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3161(h)(1)(A)—a defendant would not be transported out of 
his detention facility for a psychological examination in the 
absence of such a court-ordered competency determination.  
Therefore, section 3161(h)(1)(A) cannot be interpreted to 
exclude all periods of delay related to examinations because 
section 3161(h)(1)(F) places a specific limitation on the 
excludability of an unreasonable period of delay in 
transporting a defendant to the site of that very examination.  
To interpret section 3161(h)(1)(A) in such a way would render 
section 3161(h)(1)(F) superfluous because it would never be 
necessary to apply section 3161(h)(1)(F) to determine if a 
period of delay in transporting a defendant to a psychological 
examination is unreasonable and, therefore, non-excludable; 
section 3161(h)(1)(A) would always exclude such period of 
delay, and the limitations contained in section 3161(h)(1)(F) 
would be devoid of meaning. 
This interpretation finds support in Henderson, in which 
the Supreme Court counseled parties to read the exclusions 
contained in section 3161(h)(1) “in connection with” each 
other.  476 U.S. at 328.  In Henderson, the Supreme Court held 
that “prompt disposition” of a motion—as referred to in the 
predecessor to section 3161(h)(1)(D)—must be interpreted 
with reference to the thirty-day limitation contained in the 
predecessor to section 3161(h)(1)(H), such that “prompt 
disposition” must be interpreted to mean disposition of a 
motion within thirty days of that motion’s being “under 
advisement” by a court.  Id. at 329.  Thus, in Henderson, the 
Supreme Court held that a period of delay that is excludable 
under one subsection of section 3161(h)(1) may be limited by 
specific language contained in a wholly separate subsection of 
section 3161(h)(1). 
In reaching our holding, we simply have used the same 
interpretive approach that the Supreme Court used in 
Henderson.  We hold that the period of delay that is excludable 
under section 3161(h)(1)(A) for proceedings to determine the 
mental competency of a defendant, including examinations, is 
limited by the specific language of section 3161(h)(1)(F), 
which explicitly states that a period of delay in transporting a 
defendant to the site of an examination in excess of ten days is 
presumptively unreasonable.  Therefore, we hold that the 
period of delay between a party’s filing a motion for a 
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competency determination and a court’s disposition of that 
motion is excludable, except that only ten days for transport of 
the defendant to the site of a psychological examination are 
automatically excludable; any period of transport delay in 
excess of ten days is presumptively unreasonable and, 
consequently, presumptively non-excludable.7 
IV. 
We now must determine the extent to which the period 
of delay in transporting Williams to FMC Butner in 2014 is 
excludable for purposes of the seventy-day speedy trial clock.  
The District Court entered its order directing that Williams be 
transported to FMC Butner for a psychological examination on 
June 11, 2014.  Pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(F), the period 
through June 21, 2014—ten days from the District Court’s 
order directing Williams’s transport—is automatically 
excludable.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F).  The thirty-seven-
day period between June 21, 2014, and July 29, 2014—when 
Williams arrived at FMC Butner—is presumptively 
unreasonable and, therefore, presumptively non-excludable.  
See id. 
The Government has not overcome the presumption that 
such thirty-seven-day period is non-excludable.  The District 
Court held an evidentiary hearing with respect to the reasons 
                                                 
7 Our holding is limited to the impact of section 3161(h)(1)(F) 
on section 3161(h)(1)(A) in particular.  We need not, and do 
not, opine on the interplay between section 3161(h)(1)(F) and 
other subsections of section 3161(h), including section 
3161(h)(4), which excludes periods of delay resulting from the 
fact that the defendant is actually mentally incompetent.  One 
of our sister circuits recently has addressed this issue, holding 
that any period of delay following a court’s determination that 
a defendant is mentally incompetent is excludable under 
section 3161(h)(4) and that section 3161(h)(1)(F) does not 
limit the excludability of such period of delay whatsoever.  See 
United States v. Romero, 833 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2016).  This 
holding of our sister circuit provides further support for the 
proposition that if section 3161(h)(1)(F) is to have any 
meaning, that subsection must relate to section 3161(h)(1)(A) 
and act as a limitation thereon. 
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for the delay in transporting Williams to FMC Butner, and thus 
the record is well developed in this regard.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, which was held on February 25, 2016, the District 
Court heard testimony from the representative of the United 
States Marshals Service who was responsible for making 
Williams’s transport arrangements.  The only explanation for 
the delay that was offered by the representative of the Marshals 
Service is that the Marshals Service did not receive the District 
Court’s order directing Williams’s transport until July 9, 2014.  
The automatic ten-day transport delay exclusion under section 
3161(h)(1)(F), however, begins on “the date of an order . . . 
directing such transportation”; the ten-day period does not 
begin on the date that the Marshals Service receives actual 
notice of such an order.  18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, delay—beyond ten days—in transporting a 
defendant that is attributable only to negligence on the part of 
the Government or a district court in relaying to the Marshals 
Service the order directing the defendant’s transport is patently 
unreasonable and non-excludable.  To hold otherwise would 
require us to ignore the text of section 3161(h)(1)(F)—which 
places the sole focus of the inquiry on the date of a court’s 
order—and would require us to impose a notice requirement 
that the statute otherwise does not contain. 
Therefore, the thirty-seven days that elapsed between 
June 21, 2014, and July 29, 2014, are non-excludable because 
the Government has not overcome the presumption that this 
period of delay in transporting Williams to FMC Butner is 
unreasonable.  Given that the Government concedes that a 
separate, fifty-three-day period of non-excludable delay 
elapsed between October 9, 2015, and December 2, 2015, a 
total of ninety days of non-excludable time had elapsed prior 
to the commencement of a trial of Williams, in violation of the 
seventy-day clock imposed by the Speedy Trial Act pursuant 
to section 3161(c)(1).  Therefore, Williams’s rights under the 
Speedy Trial Act were violated, and the District Court erred in 
denying his Motions to Dismiss. 
V. 
If the Government does not commence a trial of a 
defendant before the seventy-day speedy trial clock expires, 
“the information or indictment shall be dismissed.”  
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Id. § 3162(a)(2).  Dismissal of an information or indictment is 
mandatory, rather than discretionary, upon a violation of the 
Speedy Trial Act.  See United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 
382, 390 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Under section 3162(a)(2) as 
amended, dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”).  Section 
3162(a)(2) sets forth factors that courts should consider when 
determining whether to dismiss an information or indictment 
with or without prejudice for a violation of the Speedy Trial 
Act, including “the seriousness of the offense[,] the facts and 
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal[,] and the 
impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter 
and on the administration of justice.”  18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 
Under most circumstances, a district court should 
determine, in the first instance, whether an information or 
indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice.  See, 
e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006) (“The 
sanction for a violation of the [Speedy Trial] Act is dismissal, 
but we leave it to the District Court to determine in the first 
instance whether dismissal should be with or without 
prejudice.”); Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d at 390 (remanding to the 
district court “with directions that the court dismiss the 
indictment with or without prejudice, according to its findings 
under section 3162(a)(2)”).   
Our sister circuits are in agreement, however, that 
“[w]hile the decision is generally the trial court’s in the first 
instance, remand for a hearing is not required if the answer is 
so clear that no purpose would be served by a remand.”  
Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d at 600 (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 2004)); 
accord United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2010) (“When the result of th[e] balancing test [under section 
3162(a)(2)] is so clear that remand constitutes an unnecessary 
expenditure of judicial resources, a court of appeals ought to 
engage the § 3162(a)(2) factors rather than remand on the issue 
of prejudice.”); United States v. Mora, 135 F.3d 1351, 1358 
(10th Cir. 1998) (“The decision whether to dismiss with or 
without prejudice usually belongs to the district court in the 
first instance, unless the answer is so clear that remand is 
unnecessary.”); United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (“[T]he district court therefore . . . should make the 
determination [regarding prejudice] unless the answer is so 
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clear that no purpose would be served by a remand to the 
district court.”).  The Sixth Circuit, in Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d at 
600–01, held that remand was unnecessary in that case because 
the defendant had served his full sentence, as well as his 
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release.  The 
Sixth Circuit reasoned that even though the defendant’s crimes 
were serious in nature and that there was no showing of bad 
faith on the part of the Government, “no purpose would be 
served by retrying [the defendant] for the offenses for which 
he has already been punished in full, [and] there is no reason 
to require the district court to hold a hearing on the issue.”  Id. 
at 601. 
Here, we are presented with the same issue as in 
Tinklenberg.  The District Court sentenced Williams, who had 
been detained for over three-and-a-half years, to “time served.”  
It also appears from the record that Williams has completed his 
one-year term of supervised release without violating its terms. 
Thus, Williams has served the entirety of his sentence, and no 
purpose would be served by retrying Williams for the offenses 
contained in the Indictment.  See id.  It is clear that dismissal 
without prejudice in this case would be contrary to the 
administration of justice because Williams already has been 
punished in full, and we therefore will remand to the District 
Court with the direction to dismiss the Indictment with 
prejudice. 
VI. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s denial of Williams’s Motions to Dismiss, vacate the 
judgment of conviction and sentence imposed, and remand to 
the District Court with the direction to dismiss the Indictment 
with prejudice. 
